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We analyze the problem of choosing the most appropriate method for apportioning taxes
in a democracy. We consider a simple model of taxation and restrict our attention to piece-
wise linear tax methods, which are almost ubiquitous in advanced democracies worldwide.
In spite of facing an impossibility result saying that if we allow agents to vote for any
piece-wise linear tax method no equilibrium exists, we show that if we limit the domain
of admissible methods in a meaningful way, albeit not restrictive, an equilibrium does
exist. We also show that, for such a domain, a wide variety of methods can be supported
in equilibrium. This last result provides rationale for some activities of special interest
groups.
JEL numbers: D72, H24.
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1 Introduction
The primary struggle among citizens in all advanced democracies is over the distribution of
economic resources. Income taxation, besides being a major source of state funds, is one of the
essential tools for solving such a struggle, which makes it a matter of concern for politicians
and economists alike. The search for the perfect income tax structure is (and has been for
a long time) a milestone and even though some consensus has been reached (e.g., almost all
countries in the world use statutory tax schedules speciﬁed only in terms of the brackets and
 Acknowledgment will be added later.








tax rates) the discussion is far from being over.1 In this paper, we approach this issue from
a political economy perspective, upon studying the political process in which tax methods
are either chosen directly by voters, according to majority rule, or via elections in a perfectly
representative democracy.
Academic interest in this area started to emerge after Foley (1967), who analyzed the
problem of voting over taxes in an endowment economy. Foley focused on the case of ﬂat taxes
(with or without exemption; and allowing or excluding for the existence of negative taxes) and
showed that, for such a class, there always exists a majority rule equilibrium, i.e., a (ﬂat) tax
method that cannot be overturned by any other member of the class through majority rule.2
In this paper, we plan to focus on the class of piece-wise linear tax methods (rather than
ﬂat taxes) which, as mentioned above, seems to be almost ubiquitous in advanced democracies
worldwide. For such a class, however, Foley’s result does not extend and a majority rule
equilibrium fails to exist. In other words, any piece-wise linear tax method can be overturned
by another piece-wise linear tax method through majority rule. This is actually not more than
another instance of Condorcet’s paradox of voting, which is perhaps best exempliﬁed by the
problem of determining the division of a cake by majority rule (or, equivalently, tax shares by
majority rule from a given initial distribution of endowments).3
Such a result might lead one to despair of ever achieving a voting equilibrium for any
democratic polity. Nevertheless, as Campbell (1975) puts it, majority voting is never allowed
to operate by itself without restraints imposed by constitution and convention. We actually
show that if we limit the class of admissible methods in a meaningful way, albeit not restrictive
(namely, by considering a natural subclass made of a non-countable set of piece-wise linear tax
methods) the existence of a majority rule equilibrium is guaranteed. As a matter of fact, we
construct the precise equilibrium for any parameter conﬁguration of the model and show an
interesting feature of it: any tax method within the class can be a majority rule equilibrium
1In the 2008 US presidential election we had a recent instance of such a discussion. President (then, Senator)
Obama proposed a tax plan that would make the tax system signiﬁcantly more progressive by providing large
tax breaks to those at the bottom of the income scale and raising taxes signiﬁcantly on upper-income earners.
Senator McCain instead advocated for a tax plan that would make the tax system more regressive, upon
providing relatively little tax relief to those at the bottom of the income scale while providing huge tax cuts to
households at the very top of the income distribution (e.g., Burman et al., 2008).
2Foley’s work mostly relies on verbal discussion. A more formal treatment of his model (and some of his
results) is provided by Gouveia and Oliver (1996).








provided the predetermined level of aggregate ﬁscal revenue is properly chosen.
The last result mentioned above might be interpreted as a rationale for some usual tactics of
special interest groups. Becker (1985) suggested that by exerting some kind of political pressure
interest groups are able to a ect the tax they pay. This generated a sizable literature focusing on
the relationships between lobbies (special interest groups) and politicians showing, among other
things, that lobbies may directly inﬂuence the policy outcome by targeting politicians (see, for
instance, Grossman and Helpman (2001) and the literature cited therein). Nevertheless, such
a direct channel of policy inﬂuence is not always e ective, or feasible, for lobbies. An instance
of this is precisely the case of direct democracy, in which politicians are simply not the policy-
makers and, therefore, lobbies need to target voters. Our result provides an open window for
lobbies to a ect the policy outcome (in this case, the tax method) in a subtle and indirect way.
Instead of lobbying politicians (or voters) directly to achieve a desired tax method, they can
achieve the same goal upon lobbying for a precise aggregate ﬁscal revenue.
The result might also be interpreted as a rationale for the behavior of corrupt politicians that
might manipulate the budget (and ﬁx a predetermined value of the aggregate ﬁscal revenue) in
order to lead the citizenry to a given tax schedule. Political corruption has been a persistent
phenomenon throughout history and across societies. It is found today in many di erent forms
and degrees in all types of political systems. In a well-functioning democracy, citizens hold
politicians accountable for their performance. This is predicated upon voters having access to
the information that allows them to evaluate politician performance (e.g., Ferraz and Finan,
2008). For this reason, a corrupt politician usually seeks to conceal his illegal activities from
his constituents hence keeping voters ignorant or at least uncertain about them.4 Our result
provides a plausible option for a corrupt politician to keep voters ignorant about the goal of
favoring a precise tax method by means of focusing on setting a precise aggregate ﬁscal revenue.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the model. In Section
3, we provide our results regarding the existence of majority-rule equilibria for piecewise linear
tax methods. In Section 4, we explicitly construct the equilibria and focus on some of their
properties providing the rationale for some tactics of special interest groups, as well as corrupt
politicians, described above. In Section 5, we explore how to extend our analysis to the case of
a model of a perfectly representative democracy. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
4Here we interpret as corrupt a political act which violates the public interest for private interest or gain.
An alternative view, in contrast with the one we endorse here, holds that a political act is corrupt if the public







  2 The model
We study taxation problems in a variable population model, ﬁrst introduced by Young (1988).
The set of potential taxpayers, or agents, is identiﬁed by the set of natural numbers N. Let N be
the set of ﬁnite subsets of N, with generic element N. For each i   N, let yi   R+ bei’s (taxable)
income and y   (yi)i N the income proﬁle. A (taxation) problem is a triple consisting of a
population N  N, an income proﬁle y   RN
+, and a tax revenue T   R+ such that
 
i N yi   T.
Let Y  
 
i N yi. To avoid unnecessary complication, we assume Y =
 
i N yi > 0. Let DN
be the set of taxation problems with population N and D    N NDN.
Given a problem (N,y,T)  D,atax proﬁle is a vector x   RN satisfying the following
three conditions: (i) for each i   N,0  xi   yi, (ii)
 
i N xi = T and (iii) for each i,j   N,
yi   yj implies Ri(N,y,T)   Rj(N,y,T) and yi   Ri(N,y,T)   yj   Rj(N,y,T). We refer to
(i) as boundedness, (ii) as balancedness and (iii) as order preservation. A (taxation) method on
D, R: D    N NRN, associates with each problem (N,y,T)  D a tax proﬁle R(N,y,T) for
the problem.5 Instances of methods are the head tax, which distributes the tax burden equally,
provided no agent ends up paying more than her income, the leveling tax, which equalizes post-
tax income across agents, provided no agent is subsidized and the ﬂat tax, which equalizes tax
rates across agents.
All these methods are instances of piece-wise linear tax methods. Formally, a piece-wise
linear tax method is a method associated to a vector of brackets, rates and lump-sum levies. For
each bracket, a given marginal tax rate is proposed and the corresponding lump-sum levies of
the brackets are designed so that the schedule moves continuously from one bracket to another.
More precisely, a method R is piece-wise linear if for each (N,y,T)  D there exist sequences
{ j, j, j}k
j=1 such that
(i) For each j =1 ,...,k,  j, j   R+ and  j   R;
(ii) For each j =1 ,...,k   1,  j    j+1;
5In essence, the problem under consideration is a distribution problem, in which the total amount to be
distributed is exogenous, and the issue is to determine methods providing an allocation for each admissible
problem. There is another branch of the taxation literature in which no reference to the amount of revenue to
be raised is made (e.g., Ok, 1995; Mitra and Ok, 1996). In such a branch, the basic problem is to determine
a tax function yielding the tax associated to each positive income level. An underlying assumption of the
corresponding models is to assume the existence of a continuum of agents (a reasonable assumption only in the
case of arbitrary large populations), which allows the use of calculus. A more general approach encompassing








(iii) For each j =1 ,...,k,0   j   1.
(iv) For each j =1 ,...,k   1,  j j +  j =  j+1 j +  j+1;
(v) For each j =2 ,...,k, (1    j) j 1    j     j j 1;
and, for each i   N,
Ri (N,y,T)= jyi +  j,
where j is such that  j 1   yi    j.
Note that item (iii) above guarantees that every tax schedule has slope less than one. Item
(iv) guarantees that the path of taxes generated by the method, for a given level of tax revenue,
is continuous. Finally, item (v) guarantees that the tax payed by each agent is neither negative
nor higher than her pre-tax income.
 
 
y   R
1    4
1    3
1    2
1    1
y  1  2  3  4






Figure 1: A piece-wise linear tax method . This ﬁgure illustrates a piece-wise linear tax method
originated by { j, j, j}4
j=1. If y is lower than  1, the marginal tax rate is  1. For  1   y    2, the
marginal tax rate is  2. For  2   y    3, the marginal tax rate is  3, and for  3   y    4, the
marginal tax rate is  4.
We will analyze the problem in which agents vote for tax methods according to majority rule. We
assume that voters are self-interested: given a pair of alternatives, a taxpayer votes for the alternative
that gives her the greatest post-tax income. We say that a method R is a majority rule equilibrium for a
set of methods S if, for any (N,y,T)  D, there is no other method R   S such that, y R  (N,y,T) >







  3 The existence of equilibrium
3.1 A negative result
We start this section with a negative result.
Theorem 1 There is no majority rule equilibrium for the family of piece-wise linear tax methods.
Even though the technical proof of this result might be cumbersome, its logic should be clear. It
all amounts to realize that given a piece-wise linear tax method, one can construct another (piece-wise
linear) method increasing taxes for a small group of taxpayers and reducing the burden for all the
others, while keeping the tax revenue constant (see Figure 2). The argument, which is even valid for
two-piece linear methods, is similar to others used in related models (e.g., Hamada, 1973; Marhuenda
and Ortu˜ no-Ort´ ın, 1998).
A caveat is worth mentioning. If more than half of the agents are paying zero taxes, we cannot
reduce their burdens and thus the corresponding tax allocation could not be defeated through majority
rule by any other allocation. Nevertheless, there is no method guaranteeing that more than half of
the agents are paying zero taxes for any admissible problem (although there certainly exist methods
doing so for speciﬁc problems). The most extreme case would be the leveling tax, which would always
be the most preferred method by the agent with the lowest income. This method, however, can be
defeated by other piece-wise linear methods in many problems (in which, needless to say, there is not
a majority of the population facing a zero tax burden with the leveling tax).
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Figure 2: A piece-wise linear tax method defeating another. This ﬁgure illustrates a
piece-wise linear tax method defeating a given one upon reducing the burden for low-income agents







  3.2 A positive result
Given Theorem 1 our aim now shifts to prove the existence of a majority rule equilibrium for a
su ciently large family of piece-wise linear tax methods. To do so, let us consider the following family
 
{R }  [0,1]
 
made of a continuum of piece-wise linear methods and referred to as the TAL-family of
methods.6






min{ yi, } if T    Y
max{ yi,y i   µ} if T    Y
where   and µ are chosen so that
 
i N R 
i (N,y,T)=T.
The tax methods in this family have two components. The ﬁrst component is a proportional
contribution given by the value of the parameter  . The second component is a term that depends
on whether the amount of taxes collected by this proportional system exceeds or falls short of what
is required. More precisely, R 
i (N,y,T)= yi +  i (N,y,T) for all i   N, where the precise formula
of  i (N,y,T) depends on the di erence between T and  Y. If T =  Y the tax burden is allocated as
with the ﬂat tax, i.e.,  i (N,y,T) = 0 for all i   N. If T <  Y , (i.e., the proportional tax collection
exceeds the tax burden) the richest agents get a rebate of  i (N,y,T)=     yi so that they end up
paying the same amount. That is to say, they are taxed marginally at zero. If, however, T >  Y (i.e.,
the proportional tax collection is insu cient to cover the needs) the richest agents will increase their
contributions with  i (N,y,T) = (1    )yi   µ, which thus represents an overall marginal tax rate of
1.7
Clearly, any given problem (N,y,T) will fall within the last case by reducing su ciently the value
of the parameter  . In the limit, i.e., for   = 0, the tax method corresponds to the leveling tax.
Symmetrically, by letting     1, we can always make of this taxation problem one of the second case.
In the limit, i.e.,   =1 , the tax method coincides with the head tax.
The methods in the family impose to each taxpayer a rationing of the same sort as that faced by
the whole society. Namely, if the tax burden is below a certain fraction of the aggregate income, then
no taxpayer can pay more than such a fraction of her gross income. Similarly, if the burden is above
a certain fraction of the aggregate income, then no taxpayer can pay less than such a fraction of her
gross income.
6This family was introduced, in the dual framework of bankruptcy problems, by Moreno-Ternero and Villar
(2006).
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Figure 3: The tax method R . This ﬁgure illustrates the two possible types of tax schemes
originated by R  to yield a predetermined tax return T. If T is relatively small (T    Y ), the
marginal tax rate is   up to some income level, and 0 afterwards. If X is relatively large (T    Y ),
the marginal tax rate is   and then 1.
The family is indeed a generalization of a method inspired in the Talmud (e.g., Aumann and
Maschler, 1985), which corresponds to the case in which the fraction of the aggregate income in the
above deﬁnition is precisely one half, which can be regarded as a psychological threshold appropriated
to switch the focus from taxes to net incomes. Moving such a threshold to any arbitrary fraction,
we obtain a wide variety of options. As a matter of fact, we can see how the family encompasses a
whole continuum set of methods ranging from the “least” progressive (the needs-blind head tax) to
the “most” progressive (the incentives-blind leveling tax) piece-wise linear tax schemes.8 Thus, voters
are confronted with a wide variety of choices to select the best tax scheme, even if we restrict their
options to this family. Restricting to a one-parameter family of tax methods in which the parameter
reﬂects the degree of progressivity (or regressivity) of the method is a usual course of action in taxation
models (e.g., B´ enabou, 2000, 2002).
The methods in the TAL-family obey two natural principles in taxation. The ﬁrst one, known as
consistency, says that the way that taxpayers split a given tax total depends only on their own taxable
incomes. In other words, consistency expresses the robustness of a method under the departure of
some agents with their contributions. The second one, known as scale invariance, says that the relative
distribution of taxes should not depend on anything more than the relative sizes of taxable incomes.
8It is not di cult to show that the head (resp. leveling) tax shares the tax burden so that the corresponding









It turns out that the TAL-family comprises all the consistent and scale-invariant methods that share
a pattern of equality in the tax proﬁles they propose (e.g., Thomson, 2008).
Finally, it is worth mentioning that even though the ﬂat tax is not a member of the TAL-family,
all tax proﬁles proposed by such method are covered by the family. More precisely, if F denotes the
ﬂat tax method, then, for each (N,y,T)  D, F (N,y,T)=R  (N,y,T), for   = T
Y .
The main result of this section is the following:
Theorem 2 There is a majority rule equilibrium for the TAL-family of tax methods.
In order to prove Theorem 2, we need the following lemma regarding the TAL-family, which is inter-
esting on its own, and whose proof appears in the appendix.
Lemma 1 Let 0    1    2   1 and (N,y,T)  D. If n denotes the agent in N with the highest
income then R 1
n (N,y,T)   R 2
n (N,y,T).
We also need to introduce the following concept:
A method R single-crosses R  if for each (N,y,T)  D, we have the following:
(i) If Ri(N,y,T)   R 
i(N,y,T) then Rj(N,y,T)   R 
j(N,y,T) for all j such that yj   yi and
(ii) If Ri(N,y,T)   R 
i(N,y,T) then Rj(N,y,T)   R 
j(N,y,T) for all j such that yj   yi.
The single-crossing property allows one to separate those agents who beneﬁt from the application
of one method or the other, depending on the rank of their incomes. That is, if the methods R and R 
satisfy this property and Ri(N,y,T)   R 
i(N,y,T) for some i, then R  will give higher or equal shares
to all agents with incomes smaller than yi. Similarly, if Ri(N,y,T)   R 
i(N,y,T) for some i, then R
will give higher or equal shares to all agents with incomes higher than yi.
It is well known that a su cient condition for the existence of a majority rule equilibrium is that
voters exhibit intermediate preferences over the set of alternatives (e.g., Gans and Smart, 1996). Thus,
since we assume that voters are self-interested and therefore simply vote according to the post-tax
incomes that methods o er to them, it su ces to show that, for any pair of values  1, 2   [0,1], R 1
single-crosses R 2. To do so, let  1    2   [0,1] and (N,y,T)  D be given. For ease of exposition,
assume that N = {1,...,n} and y1   y2   ···  yn. Then, it is enough to show that there exists
some i    N such that:
(i) R
 1
i (N,y,T)   R
 2
i (N,y,T) for all i =1 ,...,i  and
(ii) R
 1
i (N,y,T)   R
 2
i (N,y,T) for all i = i  +1 ,...,n.
To do so, we distinguish three cases:








By the deﬁnition of the TAL-family, R
 j
i (N,y,T) = min{ jyi, j}, for all i   N and j =1 ,2,
where  1 and  2 are chosen so as to achieve feasibility. Let r1 be the smallest non-negative integer
in {0,...,n} such that T    1((
 r1
i=1 yi)+( n   r1)yr1+1) and r2 the smallest non-negative integer in
{0,...,n} such that T    2((
 r2
i=1 yi)+( n   r2)yr2+1). Note that it is straightforward to show that
r2   r1. Thus,
R 1 (N,y,T)=(  1y1,...,  1yr2,...,  1yr1, 1,...,  1), and
R 2 (N,y,T)=(  2y1,...,  2yr2, 2,...,  2,...,  2),








n r2 . Consequently, R
 1
i (N,y,T)   R
 2
i (N,y,T) for all
i =1 ,...,r2 and, by Lemma 1, R
 1
i (N,y,T)   R
 2
i (N,y,T) for all i = r1 +1 ,...,n. Now, there are
three subcases:
Subcase 1.1:  2 < 1yr2+1.
Then, i  = r2 + 1 and the single-crossing property holds.
Subcase 1.2:  2    1yr1.
Then, i  = r1 + 1 and the single-crossing property holds.
Subcase 1.3:  2   [ 1yr2+1, 1yr1].
Then, there exists some k  {r2 +1 ,...,r1   1} such that  1yk+1 > 2    1yk. Thus, i  = k and
the single-crossing property holds.
Case 2: T    2Y .
By the deﬁnition of the TAL-family, R
 j
i (N,y,T) = max{ jyi,y i  µj}, for all i   N and j =1 ,2,
where µ1 and µ2 are chosen so as to achieve feasibility. Let r1 be the smallest non-negative integer
in {0,...,n} such that T    1Y + (1    1)((
 n
i=r1+1 yi)   (n   r1)yr1+1).9 Furthermore, let r2 be the
smallest non-negative integer in {0,...,n} such that T    2Y +(1  2)((
 n
i=r2+1 yi) (n r2)yr2+1).
Note that it is straightforward to show that r2   r1. Thus,
R 1 (N,y,T)=(  1y1,...,  1yr2,...,  1yr1,y r1+1   µ1,...,yn   µ1), and

















n r2 . By Lemma 1, R 1
n (N,y,T)  
R 2
n (N,y,T). Thus, µ1   µ2. Consequently, R
 1
i (N,y,T)   R
 2
i (N,y,T) for all i =1 ,...,r2 and
R
 1
i (N,y,T)   R
 2
i (N,y,T) for all i = r1 +1 ,...,n. Now, there are three subcases:
Subcase 2.1: µ2 < (1    1)yr2+1.
Then, i  = r1 and the single-crossing property holds.
Subcase 2.2: µ2   (1    1)yr1.








Then, i  = r2 and the single-crossing property holds.
Subcase 2.3: µ2   [(1    1)yr2+1,(1    1)yr1].
Then, there exists some k  {r2 +1 ,...,r1   1} such that (1    1)yk+1 >µ 2   (1    1)yk. Thus,
i  = k and the single-crossing property holds.
Case 3:  1Y < T <  2Y .
By the deﬁnition of the TAL-family, R
 1
i (N,y,T) = max{ 1yi,y i µ} and R
 2
i (N,y,T) = min{ 2yi, }
for all i   N, where µ and   are chosen so as to achieve feasibility. Let r1 be the smallest non-negative
integer in {0,...,n   1} such that T    1Y + (1    1)((
 n
i=r1+1 yi)   (n   r1)yr1+1). Furthermore, let
r2 be the smallest non-negative integer in {0,...,n   1} such that T    2((
 r2
i=1 yi)+( n   r2)yr2+1).
Thus,
R 1 (N,y,T)=(  1y1,...,  1yr1,y r1+1   µ,...,yn   µ), and
R 2 (N,y,T)=(  2y1,...,  2yr2, ,..., ),












n r1 . Consequently, R
 1
i (N,y,T)   R
 2
i (N,y,T)
for all i =1 ,...,min{r1,r 2}. We distinguish two subcases.
Subcase 3.1: r1   r2.
Then, R
 1
i (N,y,T)   R
 2
i (N,y,T) for all i =1 ,...,r2. By Lemma 1, R 1
n (N,y,T)   R 2
n (N,y,T).
Let k be the smallest non-negative integer in N such that R
 1
k (N,y,T)   R
 2
k (N,y,T).10 Two options
are then open. If k   r1+1, then yk  µ = R
 1
k (N,y,T)   R
 2
k (N,y,T)= . Thus, yk    µ+  for all
k  = k,...,n, or equivalently, R
 1
k  (N,y,T)   R
 2
k  (N,y,T) for all k  = k,...,n and the single-crossing
property follows. If, on the other hand, r2+1  k   r1, then  1yk = R
 1
k (N,y,T)   R
 2
k (N,y,T)= .
Thus,  1yk      for all k  = k,...,r1, or equivalently, R
 1
k  (N,y,T)   R
 2
k  (N,y,T) for all k  = k,...,r1.
Now, since R
 1
r1+1 (N,y,T)=yr1+1   µ = max{ 1yr1+1,y r1+1   µ} we know that µ   (1    1)yr1+1.
Furthermore, since  1yr1     we obtain µ +     (1    1)yr1+1 +  1yr1   yr1+1   yk  for all k  =
r1 +1 ,...,n. As a result, R
 1
k  (N,y,T)   R
 2
k  (N,y,T) for all k  = k,...,n, and the single-crossing
property follows.
Subcase 3.2: r1 <r 2.
Then, R
 1
i (N,y,T)   R
 2
i (N,y,T) for all i =1 ,...,r1. Furthermore, by Lemma 1, R 1
n (N,y,T)  
R 2
n (N,y,T). Let k be the smallest non-negative integer in N such that R
 1
k (N,y,T)   R
 2
k (N,y,T).
As before, we have two options. If k   r2 + 1, then yk   µ = R
 1
k (N,y,T)   R
 2
k (N,y,T)= .
Thus, yk    µ+  for all k  = k,...,n, or equivalently, R
 1
k  (N,y,T)   R
 2
k  (N,y,T) for all k  = k,...,n,
and the single-crossing property follows. If, on the other hand, r1 +1  k   r2, then, yk   µ =
R
 1
k (N,y,T)   R
 2
k (N,y,T)= 2yk. Thus,  2yk    yk    µ for all k  = k,...,r2, or equivalently,










k  (N,y,T)   R
 2
k  (N,y,T) for all k  = k,...,r2. Now, since R
 2
r2+1 (N,y,T)=  = min{ 2yr2+1, } we
know that      2yr2+1. Furthermore, since  2yr2   yr2 µ we obtain that µ+    (1  2)yr2+ 2yr2+1  
yr2+1   yk  for all k  = r2 +1 ,...,n. As a result, R
 1
k  (N,y,T)   R
 2
k  (N,y,T) for all k  = k,...,n and
the single-crossing property follows.
The proof of Theorem 2 is in that way completed. As a matter of fact, the proof tells us that the
majority rule equilibrium for the TAL-family of tax methods is precisely the method preferred by the
median voter, i.e., the median taxpayer.
4 Some features of the equilibrium
In what follows, we make the following mild assumption, which reﬂects a well-established empirical
fact in advanced democracies.
Assumption 0. In each taxation problem, the median income is below the mean income.
Our next result summarizes the main ﬁndings within this section. To ease the exposition of its
statement we assume, without loss of generality, that, for each (N,y,T)  D, N = {1,...,n} with
n   3 odd, y1   y2   ···  yn, and m = n+1




j=m+1 yj +( n   m)ym and Y m =
 m
j=1 yj +( n   m)ym.
Theorem 3 If Assumption 0 holds, then the majority rule equilibrium for the TAL-family of tax
methods is:
• The leveling tax, if T   Y
m.
• The method corresponding to   = T Y
m
Y m , if T   Y
m.
Proof. We start with a piece of notation. Let (N,y,T)  D be given in the conditions described
above. For each k   N consider the following thresholds:
 k
1 =1 







j=k+1 yj +( n   k)yk
 k













It is straightforward to show that  k
1    k
2    k
3    k
4, and that  2
k   1, and  3








shown that, if 0    k
1    k




                   
                   
yk   Y  T
n if      1
k
f( ) if  1
k        2
k
 yk if  2
k        3
k
g( ) if  3
k        4
k
T
n if      4
k,
(1)
where f( ) is a piece-wise linear decreasing function and g( ) is a piece-wise linear increasing func-
tion.11 A graphical illustration appears in Figure 4.
Let k now be the median agent, i.e., k = m. Then, by Assumption 0, it follows that yk  Y  T
n   T
n.
As  k
3 > 0 and  k
2 < 1, there would be nine possible cases depending of the relative positions of the
remaining  k-thresholds with respect to 0 and 1. Nevertheless, they summarize in two supra-cases,
for our purposes, in light of (1). If  k
2 < 0 then the minimum of R 
k (N,y,T), and therefore the
most preferred method by agent k, is achieved for   = 0. If, otherwise,  k
2 > 0, then the minimum
of R 
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Figure 4: Individual preferences. This ﬁgure illustrates the tax burden proposed by the method
R  for agent k as a function of the parameter  .12
It is straightforward to note that, if T = Y , then T Y
m
Y m = 1. Thus, we have the next corollary.
Corollary 1 Under Assumption 0, any method within the TAL-family of tax methods can be the
majority rule equilibrium for this family, for a given predetermined level of aggregate ﬁscal revenue.
11Note that  1
1 =  1
2 and  1
3 =  1
4, whereas  n
2 =  n
3. Thus, the taxpayers with the lowest and highest incomes
only have three pieces (two of them constant with respect to  ) in their preferences.
12For simplicity, we consider the second and fourth pieces as linear in the picture, although they are indeed








Theorem 3 provides an explicit expression for the majority rule equilibrium within the TAL-family
of tax methods, as a function of the data of the tax problem (namely, the group of taxpayers and
the predetermined level of aggregate ﬁscal revenue). Corollary 1 goes further and shows that, for a
given group of taxpayers, and a given method within the family, there exists a predetermined level
of aggregate ﬁscal revenue for which such a method is the equilibrium. Thus, if there is freedom
to determine the level of aggregate ﬁscal revenue to be raised, a given method can be targeted to
become the majority rule equilibrium. Special interest groups would therefore have a strategy here to
avoid the negative image they have been portrayed with. If their goal would be to implement a given
tax method (within the family we are considering) they would just need to lobby for a certain level
of aggregate ﬁscal revenue, as the will of the people would then take care of selecting their targeted
method. Likewise, a corrupt government could just manipulate the budget to favor the implementation
of a given method and somehow hide their move behind the veil provided by the will of the people.
5 Further insights
Our previous analysis is based on a model of direct democracy. We now explore how to extend the
analysis to allow for political competition. To do so, we assume that, as in most advanced democracies,
the process of political competition is organized through parties that compete in a general election. We
assume that there are two parties (here denoted 1 and 2) running in this election and that competition
occurs only over tax policies. Given a pair of alternative policies, a taxpayer votes for the one she
prefers (i.e., the one that gives her the greatest post-tax income). If she is indi erent, she votes for
each policy with probability one-half. Let  (R1,R 2) denote the fraction of voters that vote for party




       
       
1 if  (R1,R 2) > 0.5
0.5 if  (R1,R 2)=0 .5
0 if  (R1,R 2) > 0.5
Finally, let  i(R1,R 2) denote the payo  or utility that party i =1 ,2 gets when that pair of policies
is proposed by both parties. We then assume that
 1(R1,R 2)= (R1,R 2) and  2(R1,R 2)=1   (R1,R 2).
A political equilibrium will be a Nash equilibrium of the resulting game played by the two parties,
where the payo  functions are described as above and they share a common policy space. We have








Theorem 4 If the policy space for both parties is the TAL-family of tax methods, and Assumption 0
holds, then the political equilibrium consists of both parties proposing:
• The leveling tax, if T   Y
m.
• The method corresponding to   = T Y
m
Y m , if T   Y
m.
Proof. Let (N,y,T)  D be given and  m = max{0, T Y
m
Y m }.
Claim:  (R m
,R  ) = 1, for any    =  m.
In order to prove the claim, we need three steps. Assume, without loss of generality that  m < .13
Step 1: R m
n >R  
n unless R m
k = R 
k, or yk   R m
k = yk   R 
k, for all k   N.
Step 2: R m
1 <R  
1 unless R m
k = R 
k, or yk   R m
k = yk   R 
k, for all k   N.
Step 3: R m
m =  mym.
This ﬁrst two steps can be shown upon slightly modifying the proof of Lemma 1. The third
step is a straightforward consequence of the proof of Theorem 3. The combination of the three steps
implies that m, and either 1 or n, strictly prefer the method R m
to the method R . From here, the
single-crossing condition concludes the proof of the claim.
The claim guarantees that both parties playing the method R m
is indeed a political equilibrium
as a party deviating from that proﬁle would decrease its probability of victory from 0.5 to 0. The
claim also guarantees uniqueness. If a party is not playing R m
, but its opponent is, it will have an
incentive to change its strategy and play it too, as that would imply increasing the probability of
victory from 0 to 0.5. Finally, if none of the parties is playing R m
, at least one of them will have an
incentive to deviate and play it, as this will increase its probability of victory to 1.
To conclude, we have a straightforward consequence of the last results.
Corollary 2 Under Assumption 0, any method within the TAL-family of tax methods can be supported
as the unique political equilibrium, for a given predetermined level of aggregate ﬁscal revenue.
The e ect of special interest groups in models of representative democracy has typically been
associated to a reason why political parties stop catering to the median or average voter favoring
certain types of voters over others (e.g., Grossman and Helpman, 2001). Our reading of the above
corollary as a rationale for some activities of special interest groups is based on a di erent argument.
What the corollary says is that the equilibrium policy can be altered upon moving the predetermined
level of tax revenue. But this in itself is not a surprise as it only amounts to saying that the equilibrium
policy depends on such predetermined level of tax revenue. The remarkable aspect is that each policy
in the set could be achieved as an equilibrium, and this always being a “median voter” equilibrium.








Thus, parties would always be catering to the median voter, but the median voter would change
depending on the predetermined level of tax revenue.
Another way of reading the above corollary is as a neutrality condition for the TAL-family of tax
methods. In other words, the corollary is saying that there is no bias in favor, or against, any of the
rules within the family as any of them can arise as a political equilibrium.
6 Concluding remarks
We have dealt in this paper with the issue of designing the most appropriate income tax. There is a
broad consensus worldwide about implementing piece-wise linear tax methods and therefore we have
endorsed such a restriction in our (simple) modeling. A key aspect regarding the implementation of a
piece-wise linear tax method is the choice of the corresponding brackets, rates and lump-sum levies.
Here we have analyzed such aspect assuming that the tax parameters are chosen directly by voters
according to majority rule. We have provided three main results. First, an impossibility result saying
that if we allow agents to vote freely for any piece-wise linear tax method, no equilibrium can come
out of it. Second, we show that if we restrict the universe in a meaningful way, albeit not restrictive,
an equilibrium does exist. Third, we show that, within such a (maximal) restricted domain, basically
any method can be the majority rule equilibrium, upon selecting precisely the level of aggregate ﬁscal
revenue. The results also hold for the case of a perfectly representative democracy in which tax
methods arise as a result of political competition.
The restriction to piece-wise linear tax methods has not been our only assumption in the model.
We have also imposed a constraint on the tax structure indicating that there is a predetermined level
of aggregate ﬁscal revenue that has to be raised. This is a standard feature of both optimal tax
models and voting models (e.g., Mirrlees, 1971; Romer, 1975; Roberts, 1977, Young, 1988). On the
other hand, a standard feature in optimal tax models that has been dismissed here (as in much of the
literature cited throughout this paper) is the existence of individual incentives. This is a shortcoming
of our approach, in which we assume that labor is perfectly inelastically supplied. It is left for further
research to extend our analysis to a more general model of taxation in which incomes would result
from some type of economic choices and negative taxation (i.e., subsidies) would also be allowed. An
instance of such a model has been recently studied by Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2006), who look for the
optimal income tax on the basis of e ciency and fairness principles (and under incentive-compatibility
constraints).14 In their model, agents have unequal skills (and, therefore, unequal earning abilities)
and heterogeneous preferences over consumption and leisure (and, therefore, unequal labour time
choices). It would be interesting to explore voting situations in such a model.







  7 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
We distinguish three cases:
Case 1: T    1Y .
By the deﬁnition of the TAL-family, R
 j
i (N,y,T) = min{ jyi, j}, for all i   N and j =1 ,2,
where  1 and  2 are chosen so as to achieve feasibility. Let r1 be the smallest non-negative integer
in {0,...,n} such that T    1((
 r1
i=1 yi)+( n   r1)yr1+1) and r2 the smallest non-negative integer in
{0,...,n} such that T    2((
 r2
i=1 yi)+( n   r2)yr2+1). Note that it is straightforward to show that
r2   r1. Thus,
R 1 (N,y,T)=(  1y1,...,  1yr2,...,  1yr1, 1,...,  1), and
R 2 (N,y,T)=(  2y1,...,  2yr2, 2,...,  2,...,  2),








n r2 . Consequently, R
 1
i (N,y,T)   R
 2
i (N,y,T) for
all i =1 ,...,r2. Assume, by contradiction, that R 1
n (N,y,T) <R  2





i (N,y,T) for all i = r1 +1 ,...,n. Finally, let k  {r2 +1 ,...,r1   1}. Then,
R
 1














which represents a contradiction.
Case 2: T    2Y .
By the deﬁnition of the TAL-family, R
 j
i (N,y,T) = max{ jyi,y i  µj}, for all i   N and j =1 ,2,
where µ1 and µ2 are chosen so as to achieve feasibility. Let r1 be the smallest non-negative integer
in {0,...,n} such that T    1Y + (1    1)((
 n
i=r1+1 yi)   (n   r1)yr1+1). Furthermore, let r2 be the
smallest non-negative integer in {0,...,n} such that T    2Y +(1  2)((
 n
i=r2+1 yi) (n r2)yr2+1).
Note that it is straightforward to show that r2   r1. Thus,
R 1 (N,y,T)=(  1y1,...,  1yr2,...,  1yr1,y r1+1   µ1,...,yn   µ1), and

















n r2 . Assume, by contradiction,
that R 1
n (N,y,T) <R  2




i (N,y,T) for all i = r1 +
1,...,n. Finally, let k  {r2+1,...,r1 1}. Then, R
 1






















which represents a contradiction.
Case 3:  1Y < T <  2Y .
By the deﬁnition of the TAL-family, R
 1
i (N,y,T) = max{ 1yi,y i µ} and R
 2
i (N,y,T) = min{ 2yi, }
for all i   N, where µ and   are chosen so as to achieve feasibility. Let r1 be the smallest non-negative
integer in {0,...,n   1} such that T    1Y + (1    1)((
 n
i=r1+1 yi)   (n   r1)yr1+1). Furthermore, let
r2 be the smallest non-negative integer in {0,...,n   1} such that T    2((
 r2
i=1 yi)+( n   r2)yr2+1).
Thus,
R 1 (N,y,T)=(  1y1,...,  1yr1,y r1+1   µ,...,yn   µ), and
R 2 (N,y,T)=(  2y1,...,  2yr2, ,..., ),












n r1 . Consequently, R
 1
i (N,y,T)   R
 2
i (N,y,T)
for all i =1 ,...,min{r1,r 2}. Assume, by contradiction, that R 1
n (N,y,T) <R  2
n (N,y,T), i.e.,




i (N,y,T) for all i = max{r1,r 2},...,n. Finally, let k  
{min{r1,r 2} +1 ,...,max{r1,r 2}  1}.
If r1 <r 2 then R
 1
k (N,y,T)=yk   µ    1yk whereas R
 2
k (N,y,T)= 2yk    . Thus,
R
 1
k (N,y,T)=yk   µ<y k   yn +     yk   (1    2)yn    2yk = R
 2
k (N,y,T).
If r1 >r 2 then R
 1
k (N,y,T)= 1yk   yk   µ whereas R
 2
k (N,y,T)=     2yk. Thus,
R
 1
k (N,y,T)= 1yk    1yr1+1   yr1+1   µ<  = R
 2
k (N,y,T).
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